I think I want to start this out with a clarifying point about the nature of the conversation. This is a discussion, primarily, something along the lines of a Socratic dialogue, which is very apt as we'll be discussing the Euthryphro Dilemma at this juncture. At times though, I think this will become more dialogical in nature, with both participants becoming willing to change or refine their viewpoints with regards to each others responses.
So, here goes. The heart of the question lies in the question posed by Socrates, in one of Plato's writings, to Euthyphro: Does God (or the gods in this context) choose what is good because it is good, or is the good good because God chooses it?. This is a significant question, for if in the latter, God's choice creates goodness, and in the former God chooses to be good because of an outside morality that He is subject to. The question is interesting, but I think that the way it is framed can be difficult in assailing the issue. I think that the question is inadequate because it leads towards a framework of thinking that is limiting in possibility.
Let's explore first the former choice: God chooses to be good because it is good. This presents us with a quandary: There is a God figure, who is supposedly eminently powerful, a Creator of the Universe, perhaps having the attributes of omniscient-present-puissant Being, and yet He ascribes to a outside morality, a morality that He is subject to. This is a bit of a contradiction in terms if He retains all of his omni labels. He would, by nature, have a more moral position than this outside standard, and furthermore, where would this standard come from? This standard would have to pre-exist God, and thus destroy a primary argument for the all-powerful God; His existence before all else.
The second choice, then, seems to be more reasonable. Good is good because God chooses it. God is the arbiter and definer of good, he is it's Merriam-Webster, it's dictionary. The standard that we spoke of comes from his nature and the shadow that is cast from our natures and choices in the light of his good.
1 comment:
yet the problem is that if God merely chooses and defines what is good, then it is purely arbitrary as to what Good means -- if God means good to include torture, then by definition torture is good -- which clearly strikes against our moral insights and experiences. to simply say that God would not define it this way is again rather arbitrary sounding -- and it could depend on who you talk to as to what they say God would define as good and what God would not define as god
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